

A *Priori* Skepticism
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I. Putatively A Priori Propositions (PAPs)

- (1.1) The sum of two and two is four.
- (1.2) Whatever is square is rectangular.
- (1.3) Whatever is red is colored.
- (1.4) No surface can be uniformly red and uniformly blue at the same time.
- (1.5) If 'if p then q ' is true and ' p ' is true, then ' q ' is true.
- (1.6) No claim can be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect.
- (1.7) Everything is identical to itself.

II. Constraints on Skeptical Hypotheses

- (SH1) In order for a skeptical hypothesis, SK , to raise a significant skeptical challenge to S 's putative knowledge that O , SK must be incompatible with O .
- (SH2) In order for a skeptical hypothesis, SK , to raise a significant skeptical challenge to S 's putative knowledge that O , it must be logically or metaphysically possible for O to be false.
- (SH3) In order for a skeptical hypothesis, SK , to raise a significant skeptical challenge to S 's putative knowledge that O , it must be logically or metaphysically possible for SK to be true.
- (SH4) A centered world, W , is an experiential possibility for S iff in W S 's experiences match S 's experiences in actuality.

III. Skeptical Arguments

- (2.1) If I know that *modus ponens* is correct, then I know that my belief that *modus ponens* is correct is not based on faux intuitive experiences induced in me by a bumbling evil demon.
- (2.2) I don't know that my belief that *modus ponens* is correct is not based on faux intuitive experiences induced in me by a bumbling evil demon.
- (2.3) Therefore, I don't know that *modus ponens* is correct.

- (3.1) If I know that I'm standing, then I know I'm not dreaming that I'm standing.
- (3.2) I don't know I'm not dreaming that I'm standing.
- (3.3) Therefore, I don't know that I'm standing.

- (4.1) If I know that $2 + 3 = 5$, then I know that I'm not a DW.
- (4.2) I don't know that I'm not a DW.
- (4.3) Therefore, I don't know that $2 + 3 = 5$.

IV. The A Priori Skeptical Paradox

(5.1) For any PAP, if I know that the PAP is true, then I know that I'm not a DW.

(5.2) I don't know that I'm not a DW.

(5.3) Therefore, for any PAP, I don't know that the PAP is true.

(6.1) For any argument *A*, if I know that *A* is valid, then I know that I'm not a DW.

(6.2) I don't know that I'm not a DW.

(6.3) Therefore, for any argument *A*, I don't know that *A* is valid.

(7.1) For any PAP and any argument *A*, if I know that the PAP is true or I know that *A* is valid, then I know that I'm not a DMW.

(7.2) I don't know that I'm not a DMW.

(7.3) Therefore, for any PAP and any argument *A*, I don't know that the PAP is true and I don't know that *A* is valid.

V. The Basic Form of the Skeptical Paradox

(8.1) I know that *O*.

(8.2) If I know that *O*, then I know that not-*SK*.

(8.3) I don't know that not-*SK*.